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Abstract
Background: The health impact of COVID-19 may differ in African settings as compared to countries in Europe or
China due to demographic, epidemiological, environmental and socio-economic factors. We evaluated strategies to
reduce SARS-CoV-2 burden in African countries, so as to support decisions that balance minimising mortality,
protecting health services and safeguarding livelihoods.
Methods: We used a Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered mathematical model, stratified by age, to predict
the evolution of COVID-19 epidemics in three countries representing a range of age distributions in Africa (from
oldest to youngest average age: Mauritius, Nigeria and Niger), under various effectiveness assumptions for
combinations of different non-pharmaceutical interventions: self-isolation of symptomatic people, physical
distancing and ‘shielding’ (physical isolation) of the high-risk population. We adapted model parameters to better
represent uncertainty about what might be expected in African populations, in particular by shifting the distribution
of severity risk towards younger ages and increasing the case-fatality ratio. We also present sensitivity analyses for
key model parameters subject to uncertainty.
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Results: We predicted median symptomatic attack rates over the first 12 months of 23% (Niger) to 42% (Mauritius),
peaking at 2–4 months, if epidemics were unmitigated. Self-isolation while symptomatic had a maximum impact of
about 30% on reducing severe cases, while the impact of physical distancing varied widely depending on percent
contact reduction and R0. The effect of shielding high-risk people, e.g. by rehousing them in physical isolation, was
sensitive mainly to residual contact with low-risk people, and to a lesser extent to contact among shielded
individuals. Mitigation strategies incorporating self-isolation of symptomatic individuals, moderate physical
distancing and high uptake of shielding reduced predicted peak bed demand and mortality by around 50%.
Lockdowns delayed epidemics by about 3 months. Estimates were sensitive to differences in age-specific social
mixing patterns, as published in the literature, and assumptions on transmissibility, infectiousness of asymptomatic
cases and risk of severe disease or death by age.
Conclusions: In African settings, as elsewhere, current evidence suggests large COVID-19 epidemics are expected.
However, African countries have fewer means to suppress transmission and manage cases. We found that self-
isolation of symptomatic persons and general physical distancing are unlikely to avert very large epidemics, unless
distancing takes the form of stringent lockdown measures. However, both interventions help to mitigate the
epidemic. Shielding of high-risk individuals can reduce health service demand and, even more markedly, mortality if
it features high uptake and low contact of shielded and unshielded people, with no increase in contact among
shielded people. Strategies combining self-isolation, moderate physical distancing and shielding could achieve
substantial reductions in mortality in African countries. Temporary lockdowns, where socioeconomically acceptable,
can help gain crucial time for planning and expanding health service capacity.
Keywords: COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, Coronavirus, Africa, Low-income, Control, Response, Mathematical model
Background
The COVID-19 pandemic has not only led to increased
mortality, but has also resulted in widespread socio-
economic disruption and is severely testing affected
countries’ health service capacity [1, 2]. However, to
date, its effects have mainly been observed in countries
with relatively well-resourced health systems and the fi-
nancial means to support economies during ‘lock-down’
periods. In these and other low-income settings, two fac-
tors (younger age distributions and, potentially, warmer
temperatures [3, 4]) may help to attenuate the pan-
demic’s severity. However, other factors may plausibly
combine to worsen its impact: these include demography
(larger household sizes and more intergenerational mixing
within households), environmental conditions (over-
crowded urban settlements, inadequate water and sanita-
tion), pre-existing disease burden (higher prevalence of
undiagnosed or unmanaged non-communicable diseases,
tuberculosis and, if confirmed to be risk factors for
COVID-19 severity, HIV and undernutrition) and, critic-
ally, a very low baseline of and access to hospitalisation
capacity, particularly intensive and sub-intensive care [5–
7]. In several African countries, armed conflict, food inse-
curity and resulting forced displacement further worsen
societal resilience [8–13].
Options to manage COVID-19 in Africa may be limited.
Sufficiently scaling up case management may simply be un-
feasible for many countries as the requirements, particularly
at the epidemic’s peak, may be many-fold greater than the
baseline capacity. Even in scenarios where intense
suppression measures are successfully implemented, it is
plausible that the availability of beds, clinicians, oxygen and
personal protective equipment would be critical limiting
factors [14, 15]. Suppressing the epidemic through lock-
down policies may delay transmission in the short-term,
but their economic viability beyond a timeframe of weeks is
questionable unless large economic rescue packages are
made available by global financing actors and are concretely
accessible to populations: indeed, lock-down measures and
even less intense distancing restrictions could exacerbate
poverty and undernutrition, compromise educational at-
tainment and undo improvements in access to health inter-
ventions achieved over the past decades [16–18].
To help inform COVID-19 response strategies for
African settings, we undertook a mathematical modelling
study. We explored the possible effect on hospitalisation re-
quirements and mortality of interventions considered to
date in high-income settings, including self-isolation of
symptomatic persons, general distancing (reduction of over-
all contacts) outside the household and more intensive lock-
down measures. We also quantified the potential of an alter-
native option we refer to as ‘shielding’, whereby people at
high risk of COVID-19 severe disease are specifically pro-
tected through a variety of community-led arrangements,
such as neighbourhood-level house swaps, to create ‘green
zones’ wherein high-risk residents are physically isolated for
an extended period, but supported to live safely and with
dignity: epidemiologically, this option seeks to reduce trans-
mission within the high-risk groups that may otherwise con-
tribute a large amount of hospitalisation and mortality.
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Methods
Model structure
We adapted a previously developed discrete-time
Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Removed (SEIR) com-
partmental model, stratified by age group and disease
status (asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic, and symptom-
atic) [19]. Detail is provided in Additional file 1.
In brief, the model progresses a population through
time based on assumed age-dependent contact of sus-
ceptible with infectious individuals. After their infectious
period, all individuals are assumed to be immune until
the end of the simulation (Removed compartment). The
model is stratified into 16 age groups, with people under
75 years stratified into 5-year age-bands and one add-
itional stratum for ≥ 75 years. The model population is
closed, with no births or ageing, and deaths remain in
the Removed compartment.
Transmissibility assumptions
We adopted epidemiological parameter values (serial
interval, infectiousness by symptom stage, and incuba-
tion, infectiousness and symptomatic periods) used by
Davies et al. [20, 21] (see Additional file 1). We assumed
an age-dependent probability of developing clinical
symptoms [20]. Asymptomatic individuals were assumed
to be half as infectious as symptomatic individuals, but
we present below and in Additional file 1 a sensitivity
analysis of this assumption. Clinical progression of
symptomatic cases to severe disease is assumed not to
affect their infectiousness.
To represent the full range of age structures in Africa,
we ranked countries according to their mean age, and
selected countries with the youngest (Niger), oldest
(Mauritius) and median (Nigeria) mean age as case stud-
ies. Key country-specific data inputs were age-specific
population sizes, sourced from United Nations World
Population Prospects estimates [22] and age- and
setting-specific social contact matrices. As no empirical
data on age-specific social mixing patterns were available
for these three countries, we used previously published
synthetic contact matrices, namely projections of a Euro-
pean multi-country contact pattern study adjusted to in-
dividual countries based on national demographic and
socio-economic characteristics [23]. As an alternative
(summarised in the main text and presented more ex-
tensively in Additional file 1), we sampled randomly
from three empirical contact matrices from previously
published studies of populations in semi-urban to rural
communities in Kilifi, Kenya, rural Mbarara district,
Uganda and Bulawayo city in Zimbabwe [24–26], with
equal probability of sampling for each of the three matri-
ces. All contact data were stratified according to whether
the contact was within or outside the household.
To account for uncertainty regarding the transmissibil-
ity of SARS-CoV-2 in Africa, we implemented the model
stochastically. We sampled values for the basic
reproduction number R0 from estimates from country-
specific effective reproduction numbers Rt [27] for early
March, prior to implementation of lockdowns [28],
where estimates were above 1. These Rt values are esti-
mated from a time series of reported cases, accounting
for delays between infection and case onset. However,
these estimates do not account for potential underre-
porting of cases, nor do they adjust for some of the con-
trol measures (e.g. case finding) already implemented
before lockdowns (WHO database ref). Therefore, we
also sampled R0 estimates from a pooled distribution of
early R0 estimates and present results for both Rt and R0
scenarios. Early mean estimates for Rt were 1.8 (1.2–2.5)
for Niger and 1.6 (1.1–2.3) for Nigeria. Due to a low
number of reported cases, no reliable estimate of Rt was
available for Mauritius, and we instead sampled from all
early Rt estimates from all available African countries,
resulting in a mean Rt estimate of 1.6 (1.1–3.3). Mean
estimated R0 using the global distribution was 2.6 (1.6–
3.6). Preliminary sensitivity analyses showed that vari-
ability in model output was mainly affected by variability
in R0. Due to the larger variability in the R0 estimates
compared to the Rt estimates, in each scenario, we used
400 model runs using the former and 200 model runs
using the latter. We implemented assumed R0 estimates
by scaling the probability of transmission per contact
with an infectious person in accordance with the ratio
between the target R0 and the dominant eigenvalue of
the Next-Generation Matrix (Additional file 1). We ex-
plore the effect of different R0 values in Additional file 1.
Case severity assumptions
In high-income countries, the severity of SARS-CoV-2
infections has been shown to increase with age and
prevalence of various comorbidities [29–31]. In practice,
individual comorbidities co-occur (e.g. diabetes and
hypertension), and co- and multimorbidity increase with
age [32]. To simplify assumptions, we took age as a sin-
gle predictor of severity, applying current evidence on its
association with risk of symptomatic disease, severe dis-
ease (i.e. requiring hospitalisation), critical disease (need
for intensive care) and death.
However, in African and low-income countries, an
average person’s underlying vulnerability may corres-
pond to that of an individual with greater chronological
age in a high-income setting due to life-course effects in-
cluding malnutrition, infections and often unmanaged
non-communicable diseases. It is not yet known how
this might affect COVID-19 severity, although Global
Burden of Disease estimates show strong associations
between income level and the severity of other
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respiratory infections, particularly in younger age groups
[33]. To account for this, we shifted age-specific severity
risks (probability of becoming a severe case) towards
younger age by 10 years. We also present results for a 0-
and 5-year shift. To explore the effect of increased vul-
nerability and lack of access to healthcare, we also multi-
plied current estimates of age-specific case-fatality ratios
(CFR; from China and the Diamond Princess cruise ship
outbreak [34]) among symptomatic cases by a factor of
1.5 (used for our main analysis, with values of 1.0 and
2.0 explored in sensitivity analysis; see Additional file 1).
We did not make assumptions about the proportion of
cases that would receive appropriate treatment: the CFR
multiplier factor attempts to capture worse prognosis
under limited or no treatment.
Response interventions
The range of response interventions explored, alone
or in combination, are outlined in Table 1, and more
information on their model implementation is found
in Additional file 1. We assumed these would be ap-
plied at the country level, and initiated once daily in-
cidence crosses a threshold of 1 infection per 10,000
people. Once initiated, interventions would remain in
place over 12 months (in practice, we expect that in-
terventions would be lifted sooner if the epidemic is
demonstrably over).
Self-isolation was implemented as a reduction in trans-
missibility of infected people during their symptomatic
period, equivalent to a reduction in their contacts. We
did not account for additional quarantine of other mem-
bers in the same household.
General physical distancing was implemented as a re-
duction in all contacts outside the household. We as-
sumed no change in transmission within the household.
Shielding was implemented by stratifying the population
into one shielded and one unshielded compartment. In
the presence of shielding, mixing between the shielded
and unshielded population would reduce by some degree,
while mixing within the shielded population may remain
the same as the pre-shielding baseline (i.e. how much con-
tact people within the group eligible for shielding had
among themselves before they were shielded), decrease (to
zero if people are shielded individually) or increase relative
to this baseline if shielded people are resettled in over-
crowded housing. While in the intervention’s practical ap-
plication people should be shielded on the basis of age
and/or known comorbidities, for this model we assumed
more simplistically that varying proportions of the popula-
tion aged 60 years and above would be shielded.
Analysis outcomes
We compared outcomes under different intervention
values and strategies (combinations of interventions) for
each unique combination of sampled R0 and model
seeds. We present median, 50% and 95% quantiles of dif-
ferences in outcomes across all combinations, and show
results stratified by R0 in Additional file 1.
Table 1 Summary of response interventions explored in the study
Intervention Description Model implementation Range explored
Self-isolation of symptomatic
people
People with symptoms of
possible COVID-19 isolate them-
selves in their home until
symptom-free.
Relative reduction in all social
contacts among symptomatic
people only, during the period
over which they are
symptomatic.




probability of transmission per
contact)
Behaviour change, promotion of
handwashing, varying degrees of
curtailment of transport, social
and work gatherings.
Relative reduction in contacts
outside of the household.
0–100% relative reduction in
transmission
(we assumed that ‘lockdown’
measures would correspond
to an 80% reduction) [35].
Shielding of high-risk groups Communities identify people who
meet high-risk criteria for poor
COVID-19 clinical outcomes and
resettle them in a variety of
shielded arrangements (either in-
dividual, e.g. a dedicated room
within a house, or groups of vari-
ous sizes in vacated / swapped
houses, huts or other shelters).
Contact is thereafter limited.
Within these shielded ‘green
zones’, residents also adopt
distancing and hygiene
(handwashing, face coverings if
locally appropriate) measures if
they are living together.
A proportion of people aged
≥ 60 years old is ‘shielded’.
Contact between shielded
people and unshielded people
both inside and outside the
household is reduced.
Contact among shielded
people varies depending on
the arrangement chosen.
60–100% of high-risk people
are shielded.
60–100% relative reduction in
contact with non-shielded
people.
0–400% relative change in
social contact among shielded
people, compared to contacts
among people eligible for




represents what might happen
if people are grouped within
overcrowded shielded
housing).
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For the impact of individual interventions, we consid-
ered severe cases as our primary outcome. For the im-
pact of different strategies, we observed the total
number of symptomatic cases, severe cases (those who
require hospitalisation), critical cases (those who require
intensive care, ICU), and deaths, and present the ex-
pected time until peak of the epidemic, including peak
bed demand. We mainly show estimates for the first 12
months after introduction of the first case, as the evolu-
tion of the epidemic beyond this period is subject to
considerable unknowns (e.g. availability of vaccines or
therapeutics; virus mutation, persistence of natural im-
munity). However, we also observe the probability of a
second peak over the subsequent year.
Results
Epidemic trajectories in the absence of control
Using country specific Rt estimates, simulations of an
unmitigated epidemic in Niger resulted in a median
of 3.3 million clinical cases during the first 12 months
following introduction of the first case, 35.6 million
in Nigeria and 380,000 in Mauritius (Table 2), with
the most probable epidemic peaks after 6, 8 and 5
months respectively (Fig. 1). We estimate some 20,
000 deaths due to COVID-19 in Niger, 270,000 in
Nigeria and 8000 in Mauritius would occur over the
same period, not accounting for indirect excess mor-
tality due to health service or socio-economic disrup-
tions. The impact of assumed R0 is large. Global R0
estimates yield considerably higher attack rates and
caseloads in Niger and Mauritius (Table 2). Larger
epidemics that peak early occur in scenarios where R0
is high (median total severe cases when R0 ≥ 3 are es-
timated as 171,000, 2,500,000, and 59,000 in Niger,
Nigeria, and Mauritius), whereas epidemics with lower
R0 will have a lower total and peak epidemic size
(median total severe cases when 2 ≤ R0 < 3 are esti-
mated as 108,000, 1,800,000, and 46,000 in Niger,
Nigeria, and Mauritius) and will peak later (Add-
itional file 1, Figure S11).
Table 2 Projected impact of unmitigated COVID-19 epidemics during the first 12 months following introduction of cases, by country. All
values represent the median and 95% lower and upper quantiles from all model runs in each scenario. The symptomatic attack rate is
calculated as the total number of symptomatic cases divided by the population. We show the months until the epidemic peak (defined
as the day with the highest number of new cases) and present the peak daily number of deaths and hospital bed demand
Key outcome Niger Nigeria Mauritius
Population size 24,100,000 202,900,000 1,300,000
Population aged ≥ 60 years 4% 5% 18%
Projections using country Rt estimates
Symptomatic cases 3,270,000 (30,000 to 4,980,000) 35,570,000 (5000 to 53,270,000) 380,000 (5000 to 610,000)
Symptomatic attack rate 13.6% (0.1 to 20.7) 17.5% (0 to 26.3) 29.1% (0.4 to 46.6)
Severe, non-critical cases 60,000 (300 to 110,000) 1,020,000 (100 to 1,740,000) 30,000 (400 to 60,000)
Severe, critical cases 30,000 (100 to 50,000) 440,000 (40 to 750,000) 10,000 (100 to 30,000)
Deaths 20,000 (70 to 30,000) 270,000 (30 to 460,000) 8000 (90 to 20,000)
Deaths per 1000 person-years 0.7 (0 to 1.3) 1.3 (0 to 2.3) 6.5 (0.1 to 12.8)
Epidemic peak (month) 6 (4 to 12) 8 (5 to 12) 5 (2 to 12)
Peak deaths 300 (4 to 700) 4000 (2 to 10,000) 200 (3 to 700)
Peak demand for non-ICU beds 8000 (40 to 20,000) 120,000 (10 to 330,000) 4000 (30 to 20,000)
Peak demand for ICU beds 4000 (20 to 10,000) 60,000 (7 to 180,000) 2000 (20 to 10,000)
Projections using global R0 estimates
Symptomatic cases 5,480,000 (2,980,000 to 6,840,000) 60,200,000 (35,920,000 to 69,730,000) 540,000 (360,000 to 610,000)
Symptomatic attack rate 22.7% (12.3 to 28.4) 29.7% (17.7 to 34.4) 41.7% (27.7 to 46.6)
Severe, non-critical cases 130,000 (50,000 to 190,000) 2,090,000 (1,030,000 to 2,670,000) 50,000 (30,000 to 60,000)
Severe, critical cases 60,000 (20,000 to 80,000) 890,000 (440,000 to 1,150,000) 20,000 (10,000 to 30,000)
Deaths 30,000 (10,000 to 50,000) 560,000 (270,000 to 710,000) 10,000 (8000 to 20,000)
Deaths per 1000 person-years 1.4 (0.6 to 2.1) 2.7 (1.4 to 3.5) 10.6 (6.1 to 12.9)
Epidemic peak (month) 4 (3 to 7) 4 (3 to 8) 3 (2 to 5)
Peak deaths 900 (200 to 2000) 20,000 (4000 to 30,000) 400 (100 to 700)
Peak demand for non-ICU beds 30,000 (6000 to 50,000) 480,000 (120,000 to 800,000) 10,000 (4000 to 20,000)
Peak demand for ICU beds 10,000 (3000 to 30,000) 250,000 (70,000 to 420,000) 7000 (2000 to 10,000)
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Effect of individual interventions
Self-isolation of symptomatic individuals
We estimate a reduction in severe cases during the first
12 months of the epidemic if symptomatic cases self-
isolate throughout this period with varying levels of
compliance (Fig. 2a). Increasing compliance has a nearly
linear relationship with the incidence of severe cases
when R0 values are high, but the maximum median im-
pact is a 40% reduction (under an extreme scenario of
100% reduction in transmissibility of all cases while
symptomatic) when global R0 estimates are assumed,
with little change if empirical contact matrices are used
instead (Figure S5). However, impact of self-isolation
could be much greater when R0 estimates are lower, as
reflected by the estimates under country-specific Rt esti-
mates. Although the probability of being a symptomatic
case is modelled as age-dependent, the impact of self-
isolation was similar in all countries despite their differ-
ent demographic distributions. Uncertainty intervals for
Nigeria and Mauritius were wider, but mainly reflected
differences in R0 between simulations (Figure S11). In
simulations where a low R0 was used, there was potential
for a larger reduction in severe cases. The impact of R0
variability is smaller in Niger, where a higher proportion
of transmission is due to asymptomatic infections due to
its lower average age and the age-dependency of becom-
ing a symptomatic case, as reflected by the symptomatic
attack rates in Table 2. As a result, impact of self-
isolation is lower in Niger under country-specific Rt
estimates.
Population-wide physical distancing
Figure 2b shows the estimated impact of population-
wide (i.e. not targeting any group) physical distancing,
whereby all individuals reduce their contacts outside of
the household to a certain degree, while contacts within
the household remain unchanged. Across all three coun-
tries, reducing all contacts outside the household by an
extreme of 100%, if sustained over the entire 12 months’
period, could result in a median reduction in severe
cases close to 100%, with even greater impact at lower
levels of physical distancing when R0 values are lower.
However, this would largely delay rather than prevent
severe cases, as insufficient levels of herd immunity
would develop, leading to a second wave of cases follow-
ing the relaxation of measures. Depending on the actual
R0 of Covid-19, relatively high reductions in contacts
may be needed for large impacts. Patterns were largely
consistent across countries. Stratified results by R0 are
shown in Figure S11, showing higher potential for im-
pact in settings with lower R0. For instance, when redu-
cing 40% of contacts outside of the household, reduction
in severe cases in the first 12 months of the epidemic
could be as low as 10% in scenarios with an R0 above 3,
while it could be as high as 70% in scenarios with an R0
below 2, e.g. under country-specific Rt estimates. Results
using empirical matrices are slightly less favourable
(Figure S5).
Shielding of high-risk individuals
Shielding of high-risk individuals aims to reduce the
number of severe cases among high-risk groups, and
thereby in the overall population, while having a smaller
effect on transmission in the population and thereby on
the total number of cases. Figure 3 shows the reduction
in the number of severe cases for different reductions in
contacts between shielded and unshielded individuals,
percentages of individuals shielded and changes in con-
tact intensity within the shielded group, relative to
baseline.
Niger Nigeria Mauritius



























Fig. 1 Projected incidence of symptomatic COVID-19 cases over time for simulations of an unmitigated epidemic, by country. The green line
shows the run that was closest to the median total number of cases across all model runs using global R0 estimates. The black line shows the
run that was closest to the median total number of cases across all model runs using country-specific Rt estimates. Grey lines show individual
stochastic model runs, where R0 in each run was sampled from the respective distribution
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Across all countries, reductions in severe cases in-
creased with the percentage ≥ 60 years old shielded, but
the reduction in contacts between shielded and un-
shielded individuals was more influential, with ≥ 60% re-
duction in contacts required to achieve ≥ 10% reduction
in severe cases. The degree of contact among shielded
individuals appeared to be of lesser importance for Niger
and Nigeria, with similar effect sizes regardless of
whether the shielded individuals reduce their contact
with one another to zero, remain at baseline or quadru-
ple it. This pattern does not hold for Mauritius, where a
marked drop in the effect is seen when contact among
shielded individuals quadruples, even more so when em-
pirical contact matrices are used (Figure S6): this is re-
flective of Mauritius having a larger elderly population
that contributes more to the overall proportion of severe
cases in the population and can more easily sustain
transmission within itself.
As shielding does not significantly affect transmission
dynamics, estimates are similar across scenarios with
low and high R0 (Figure S12), which is why estimates do
not differ much between scenarios using global R0 esti-
mates or country-specific Rt estimates. However, predic-
tion intervals are wider in Mauritius, where a high
proportion of the total population is shielded (8–14%).
In addition, prediction intervals are wider using country
Rt estimates, as the stochastic effects of the model have
a larger effect on the results when assumed R0 is lower
and total epidemic sizes are smaller.
Impact of potential control strategies
Without lockdowns
We explored the impact of five different strategies and
compared their impact to the unmitigated epidemic over
the first 12 months after introduction of the first case.
We assumed that self-isolation of symptomatic individ-
uals, featuring 50% reduction in their infectiousness,
would be part of any strategy. We then added (i) 20% or
(ii) 50% reduction in contacts outside the household
through physical distancing; (iii) shielding of 80% of
Fig. 2 Estimated reduction in severe cases following a self-isolation of symptomatic individuals and b population-wide physical distancing, using
synthetic contact matrices. Medians (circles), 75% (lighter shaded areas) and 50% (darker shaded area) quantiles for the percentage reduction in
severe cases during the first 12 months of the epidemic for different levels of compliance, for each country, across all model runs in each
scenario. Quantiles are calculated across all simulations representing different stochastic runs and using different R0 values in each run, drawn
from a distribution of global R0 estimates or from a distribution of country-specific Rt estimates. Estimates for reductions where no point is
available are interpolated
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individuals aged 60 and older, with a reduction of 80%
in contacts between the shielded and unshielded popula-
tion and no change in contacts within the shielded
population; (iv) a combination of shielding and 20%
physical distancing; and (v) shielding with 50% physical
distancing.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of deaths depending on
the strategy chosen. Evolution of bed demand under
each scenario is given in Figure S2. Table 3 shows the
corresponding attack rate, total number of cases, severe
cases, and critical cases, time of epidemic peak and peak
bed demand for severe and critical cases. All strategies
yielded substantial but partial reductions in key health
outcomes. Under all strategies, we estimate a high bed
capacity needed in the three countries modelled.
Whereas reducing transmission outside of the house-
hold by 20% would be more effective in reducing the
total number of symptomatic cases than shielding,
shielding could be as effective in reducing the total bed
demand at the peak of the epidemic and total number of
deaths as moderate physical distancing when R0 values
are higher, as illustrated by estimates using global R0 es-
timates. When R0 values are low however, even moder-
ate levels of social distancing are sufficient to bring R0
close to or below 1, resulting in larger effect sizes using
social distancing alone compared to shielding alone.
More substantial levels of physical distancing (50%)
would lead to far greater effects in the first 12 months of
the epidemic. However, this strategy, unlike shielding,
reduces overall transmission and thus does not
Fig. 3 Estimated reduction in severe cases when shielding high-risk individuals, by country, using synthetic contact matrices. Medians (dashed
lines) and 75% quantiles (shaded areas) of the percentage reduction in severe cases during the first 12 months of the epidemic for
different levels of reduction in contacts between shielded and unshielded people (x axis), different level of contacts among shielded
people (facet rows), and for different percentages of people ≥ 60 years old shielded (see legend), for each country, across all model runs
in each scenario
Zandvoort et al. BMC Medicine          (2020) 18:324 Page 8 of 19
necessarily result in a resolution of the epidemic through
herd immunity during this period; instead, this interven-
tion would need to be sustained into the second year
until herd immunity is reached through either natural
immunity or a vaccine, assuming immunity is long lived.
This may feature a second, albeit smaller peak during
the second year if no further mitigation measures are
taken; this further peak is absent under the other strat-
egies. However, predictions beyond the first year may
vary considerably depending on the longevity of SARS-
CoV-2 immunity and availability of potential pharma-
ceutical interventions, and should be interpreted with
caution [3].
A combination of shielding and physical distancing
would be most effective in reducing overall outcomes.
Table 4 highlights the relative reduction in hospital bed
demand for severe cases at the epidemic peak and total
number of deaths in the first 12 months of the epidemic,
under each scenario. If R0 values would be higher than
initial Rt estimates, shielding 80% of the high-risk popu-
lation and reducing contact between the shielded and
unshielded populations by 80% could be as effective in
reducing severe outcomes as general physical distancing
reducing contacts by 20%.
In combination with lockdowns
We also explored the impact a temporary lockdown
could have on these same strategies. We assumed a 2-
month lockdown, triggered at incidence 1 per 10,000
person-days, during which, in addition to self-isolation
as above, all contacts outside the household are reduced
by 80%; the remainder of the year consisted of the five
alternative strategies above.
Figure S4 shows bed demand and deaths over time
while Table S3 shows key outcomes in the first 12
months under this lockdown scenario. A lockdown
would delay, but not prevent, the epidemic peak in all
countries (under country specific Rt estimates, from 6 to
8–9 months in Niger, from 8 to 8–10months in Nigeria,
and from 5 to 5–7 months in Mauritius, while under
global R0 estimates from 4 to 6–7 months in Niger, from
4 to 6–7 months in Nigeria, and from 3 to 4–5 months
in Mauritius). However, it would not substantially affect
total epidemic sizes or peak bed demand, compared to
strategies without lockdowns, unless the epidemic is
suppressed for the entire year.
Removing self-isolation of symptomatic individuals
Figure S4 shows bed demand and deaths over time for
each modelled strategy in the absence of self-isolation,
while Table S4 shows associated key outcomes.
Removing self-isolation substantially increased the
number of cases and deaths in all scenarios. However,
this relative difference was approximately similar for
scenarios with physical distancing only (35%, 16%,
and 25% higher mortality in Niger, Nigeria, and
Mauritius) and scenarios with shielding only (40%,
13%, and 27%). The resulting increased transmission
brought the epidemic peak forward in all countries,
under both scenarios using country specific Rt esti-
mates or global R0 estimates.
Fig. 4 Estimated daily number of deaths during the first 18 months of the epidemic, under different strategies. Black lines show results using
country Rt estimates, while coloured lines show results using global R0 estimates. Thick solid lines show the run which was closest to the median
total number of deaths after 12 months across all model runs. Dashed lines are runs closest to the lower and upper 95% quantiles, while dotted
lines are runs closest to the lower and upper 50% quantiles of total number of deaths, calculated over 600 model runs. Except for the
unmitigated scenario, all scenarios assume 50% self-isolation during the symptomatic period of all symptomatic cases throughout the entire
course of the epidemic. Other interventions start when daily incidence of symptomatic cases reaches 1 case per 10,000 people. Distancing
strategies assume 20% or 50% reduction in all contacts outside of the household. Shielding strategies assume shielding of 80% of the population
aged ≥ 60 years, irrespective of underlying comorbidities, with an 80% reduction in contacts between the shielded and unshielded population,
and no change in contacts within the shielded population. Estimates for bed demand over time are given in Figure S2
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Additional sensitivity analyses
As expected, varying our base assumption on the infec-
tiousness of asymptomatic cases greatly affects the im-
pact of self-isolation of symptomatic cases: if the former
are not at all infectious, self-isolation could be highly
impactful (up to 100%), and vice versa (Figure S7). The
impact of general distancing is insensitive to this as-
sumption, while for shielding impact would decrease if
asymptomatic people are not infectious and shielded
people increase their contacts with each other (Figure
S8). Overall, the effect of mitigation strategies (all of
which assume some symptomatic self-isolation in our
base scenario) would be higher, when asymptomatic
cases contribute to transmission less (Figure S9).
Our assumption of a shift in severity risk to younger
ages had a negligible impact on the relative effectiveness
of self-isolation and physical distancing (Figure S13), but
the 10-year age-shift yielded a lower effectiveness of
shielding compared to no age shift (Figure S14), since it
increases risk among younger, unshielded age groups.
The severity and CFR assumptions substantially affect
the absolute size of the epidemic predicted by the model
(Table S6). In scenarios assuming country-specific Rt es-
timates, changing these assumptions would result in a
variation from 5000 to 30,000 deaths in Niger, 80,000 to
400,000 in Nigeria and 3000 to 12,000 in Mauritius if no
age shift or CFR increase are assumed, compared to a




We explored the impact of different non-pharmaceutical
control interventions and strategies (packages and se-
quences of interventions) that may effectively be imple-
mented in African countries to mitigate COVID-19
epidemics. Short of an indefinite-duration lock-down,
none of the interventions would likely avert very large
epidemics that result in high mortality and extreme
pressure on health services. While numerous initiatives
are underway to rapidly scale up COVID-19 case man-
agement capacity, e.g. by increasing oxygen availability
at district hospital level, the actual coverage and effect-
iveness of such treatment is difficult to predict at
present, given various possible rate-limiting factors
(competent staff availability, infection prevention and
control and steady supplies of personal protective equip-
ment, hospital infrastructure, care-seeking preferences)
[36]. At baseline, Niger, Nigeria and Mauritius had some
7000, 101,000 and 4000 hospital beds respectively [5], of
which presumably only a fraction could be assigned to
COVID-19 care without severely compromising essential
routine health services. Whether these capacities would
be sufficient highly depends on the real R0 values of
Covid-19 epidemics in these countries. When we assume
early country-specific Rt estimates for R0, non-
pharmaceutical interventions could effectively be used to
maintain hospital bed demand below these levels. How-
ever, when we assume global R0 estimates for R0, the
intervention strategies we explored (see below) would
exceed these baseline levels even under the most strin-
gent (and unrealistic) implementation.
Reassuringly, our analysis suggests that both self-
isolation of symptomatic people and moderate physical
distancing could translate into very sizable reductions in
severe cases and deaths, even when higher levels of R0
are assumed. The shielding option would likely require
high levels of adherence and isolation to yield appre-
ciable reductions in health service pressure, but could
have a higher potential to reduce mortality in the short-
term than other interventions, as it focuses on those
who experience the highest CFR. This option also pro-
motes herd immunity through mixing of other age
groups and thus carries a lesser risk of further epidemic
peaks once measures are lifted.
Different shielding arrangements could be considered,
ranging from individual arrangements wherever people
already live in multi-room houses or compounds, to
neighbours or extended family-members grouping the
most vulnerable individuals in vacated houses, to larger,
albeit epidemiologically riskier re-housing (e.g. in quar-
antined street blocks). To avoid the problem of trans-
mission within the shielded population, all such
arrangements would need to eliminate any traffic of ex-
ternal people in and out of shielded accommodation as
much as possible ensuring basic needs are met, while
also instituting infection control barriers, e.g. a desig-
nated exchange point for supplies and safe social inter-
actions and limiting contact as well as transmission
within the shielded population through distancing, hy-
giene measures, face coverings if appropriate, etc. While
our model does not explore the micro-level dynamics of
how seeding of infection into these accommodations
would affect residents, we showed, as expected, that the
amount of contact among high-risk shielded people mat-
ters: zero contact, equivalent to individual shielding,
equates to the highest effect of the intervention, while
an increase of contact from baseline, e.g. if shielded
people are rehoused in more crowded conditions than in
their households of origin, dampens the utility of this
approach and could even lead to an increase in cases
compared to the baseline of no intervention.
We next combined the above interventions into a set
of strategies, with a horizon of 12 months, that countries
could consider. We assumed that any strategy would fea-
ture, at a minimum, self-isolation of symptomatic cases
(we caution however that promotion of self-isolation
should not discourage care-seeking for other life-
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threatening health problems, e.g. malaria, particularly
among children). Our predictions suggest that country-
wide lockdowns of 2 months, if effective, would tempor-
arily suppress and delay epidemics for around 2–3
months, as noted in Europe: this reprieve would poten-
tially enable countries to mobilise resources and plan
the implementation of the next phase of their strategy.
These findings do not in themselves support lockdown
measures as a universal solution, however: such mea-
sures may be ineffective (i.e. fail to achieve a contact rate
reduction consistent with effective reproduction num-
ber < 1, the condition for suppression) or more harmful
than beneficial, including in health terms, if they severely
disrupt economies and livelihoods or encounter mistrust
and community resistance. Rather, our predictions
merely indicate that well-implemented lockdowns would
achieve the intended effect.
If lockdowns would not have been implemented, or
after they end, we predict that a combination of general
physical distancing and shielding high-risk individuals
could be a potentially achievable mitigation strategy for
countries to consider. Physical distancing entails a diffi-
cult trade-off between reducing attack rates (and hence
epidemic peak size) and extending the duration of the
epidemic, which in turn increases the period over which
shielding should be maintained (as individuals will re-
quire to be shielded until well after the epidemic peak
has finished). While stringent physical distancing (e.g.
50% reduction in extra-household contacts) would have
a large impact, such reductions may only be achieved
through socio-economically damaging and potentially
unacceptable restrictions to work, education and/or
other forms of public life. By contrast, a 20% reduction
in contacts may be more achievable and sustainable—in
some settings, this could involve a combination of hy-
giene promotion; increased access to water, soap and
other cleaning supplies (e.g. through state subsidies);
face coverings; and curtailment of some gatherings out-
side of work and school. These moderate reductions
could already result in large reductions when R0 levels in
the studied countries are lower than estimated globally.
It is unknown at present whether shielding is at all
feasible and can attain our suggested target of 80% con-
tact reduction between high- and low-risk people for
80% of high-risk people. We know of no precedent for
this intervention, but instances of its implementation in
different countries (Yemen, Ethiopia) are underway; pre-
liminary qualitative research findings from various set-
tings suggest that risk awareness is a barrier and that
within-household shielding is preferable to other solu-
tions (F Checchi, pers. comm.). Even at lower effective-
ness levels, however, shielding would still offer benefits,
particularly in terms of mortality, and accordingly need
not be discounted as an option, particularly if it can be
designed and led by communities themselves [37] with
reference to cultural and religious norms around protec-
tion of the elderly and vulnerable, thereby requiring
fewer resources than a top-down intervention. Comple-
mentary measures to protect high-risk people could in-
clude maintenance of high-adherence treatment for
NCDs, tuberculosis and HIV; cash transfers to offset loss
of income and facilitate isolation arrangements; and mo-
bile medical services to bring routine healthcare to those
shielding. To avoid stigma and cross-infection, people liv-
ing with HIV and active TB cases may need to shield indi-
vidually, and measures should be introduced to address
protection risks, such as intimate partner violence [38].
Both distancing and shielding would be strongly
dependent on the local R0: even moderate reductions in
general contacts, and some degree of self-isolation when
symptomatic, could achieve very large effects if transmis-
sibility is lower than has hitherto been observed in Eur-
ope or China, e.g. in rural parts of Africa, where this
intervention would therefore be relatively more cost-
effective; by contrast, shielding effectiveness is relatively
insensitive to R0, but would have to be sustained for a
longer period if the epidemic is protracted, as one would
expect in low transmissibility scenarios. Our analysis
showed that, even at lower levels of R0, shielding would
be beneficial to complement distancing, albeit with a
lower marginal impact as would be observed in higher
transmission settings, as might be expected in urban
settings.
We only show estimates for the first 12 months in our
analysis to make short-term predictions of the impact of
different intervention strategies. There are still many un-
knowns about how SARS-CoV-2 would behave in in dif-
ferent contexts in Africa (rural, urban, peri-urban,
displacement settings, etc.) and how people will respond
to policy measures; hence, policy makers will continuously
need to revisit the strategy to take current developments
into account. Our analysis does not necessarily reflect the
total epidemic size, as additional severe and critical cases
could accrue during the second year, especially under
strategies that focus heavily on physical distancing or if
natural immunity to infection is short-lived [3].
Comparison with other studies
Although several studies have looked at the spread of
COVID-19 in African countries [39–44], we are only
aware of one other modelling study which considers the
impact of different interventions on the spread of
COVID-19 in Africa. Walker et al. [45] used a similar
SEIR model and predicted a near 90% reduction in cases
for sub-Saharan Africa assuming a 75% reduction in
contacts starting at an incidence of 0.2 deaths per 100,
000 population per week and sustained over the first
250 days of an epidemic. Comparisons between these
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studies are complicated due to different time periods of
models and strategies investigated, but both point to a
large unmitigated epidemic which can be reduced sub-
stantially due to strong physical distancing measures.
However, even with these measures in place, all models
suggest a high burden of disease and mortality across
Africa.
Study limitations
While SEIR models have successfully been used to
model COVID-19 epidemics to date in Europe, our pre-
dictions for African countries are subject to potential in-
accuracy. Transmissibility may vary considerably across
Africa, and it is possible that countries with very concen-
trated urban populations would see an acute exponential
rise in cases, with a secondary, flatter curve affecting
outlying rural regions: models accounting for these very
distinct settlement types may be more useful for national
planning. Consequently, the duration of time that coun-
tries will be affected by COVID-19 according to our
model should be treated with caution. To date, estimates
based on reported deaths [46] or cases [47, 48] suggest
that African countries had transmissibility levels that
may have been lower as observed in Europe and else-
where. However, most African countries adopted strin-
gent containment measures early on in the epidemic,
meaning that even early Rt estimates as used in our ana-
lysis may not reflect a truly unmitigated epidemic, and
underestimate the actual transmission potential of
Covid-19 in the countries studied.
We were not able to reliably estimate country-specific
R0 levels, due to relatively low levels of reported cases and
deaths (Mauritius) and unknown levels of testing, under-
reporting of cases or impact of already implemented inter-
ventions within all countries. Instead, we conducted two
separate analyses showing results using early levels of
country-specific Rt estimates and global estimates of R0.
The country-specific Rt estimates are generally lower than
the globally estimated R0, but the median estimates of the
former do fall within 95% uncertainty intervals of the lat-
ter. Whereas assumed R0 values have a large effect on the
total size of the epidemic, they do not substantially change
the qualitative decision of comparing different non-
pharmaceutical interventions. However, shielding strat-
egies do not significantly affect transmission in the overall
population and may therefore not be preferred in low
transmission settings, where moderate nondisruptive
levels of distancing and self-isolation could be sufficient to
bring R0 levels below 1.
While we accounted for age distributions, we did not
have country-specific data on contact patterns among
age groups. Instead, we used synthetic contact matrices
extrapolated from European data by using local data on
household, workplace and school composition in the
African settings considered. A sensitivity analysis with
empirical African contact pattern data suggested broadly
similar intervention effects, but higher overall epidemic
sizes; these matrices were collected in specific areas and
may not be representative of contact patterns within the
entire country or indeed Africa as a whole.
There is no clear consensus on the impact of asymp-
tomatic infections on transmission. In accordance with
other studies [19, 20], we assumed asymptomatic infec-
tions to be 50% less infectious. Our sensitivity analysis
shows that this assumption did significantly affect the
estimated impact of self-isolation strategies. We assumed
that individuals who self-isolate would do so on the day
of symptom onset, but not when pre-symptomatic. We
made no assumptions about the effect of testing and be-
haviour change on individual behaviour, nor did we as-
sume a potential delay between onset of symptoms and
start of self-isolation.
Our results are also affected by disease severity assump-
tions. We applied age-specific risks of developing severe
disease per infection, as estimated using data from China
and the Diamond Princess outbreak, but shifted these to
earlier life by a decade to represent plausible differences in
biological age in Africa resulting from life-course expo-
sures. This crude approach may be confounded by differ-
ences in the age-specific prevalence of co-morbidities in
African countries, as well as inter-country differences in
comorbidity prevalence. Specifically, conditions with po-
tential (tuberculosis [49]) and as yet undocumented (HIV,
undernutrition, sickle-cell disease) interactions with
SARS-CoV-2 infection are far more prevalent in Africa
than China and affect relatively young age groups [32]:
these could increase COVID-19 severity overall and shift
the distribution of severe cases to younger age. Addition-
ally, the proportion of detected and correctly managed
cases of non-communicable diseases of known import to
COVID-19 progression (cardiovascular disease, diabetes,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, chronic kidney
disease) is far lower in most of Africa than in China and
Europe: this may further exacerbate disease severity.
These differing patterns of co-morbidity may also affect
the proportion of patients requiring intensive care and the
CFR. Overall, our sensitivity analysis shows that uncer-
tainty on these parameters has modest effects on the rela-
tive impact of interventions, but can have large effects on
model predictions of absolute epidemic size. Our findings
will thus need to be refined as more evidence accrues on
the virus’ severity and CFR in African settings. Whereas
these assumptions have large effects on the estimated total
epidemic sizes, their impact on the relative effectiveness of
different interventions is only minor.
Generally, our modelling framework is unsuited to in-
corporating information on underlying vulnerability fac-
tors such as population density, mobility within the
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country, armed conflict intensity, etc. [50], which may
affect transmissibility, severity and/or the feasibility and
effectiveness of response interventions. Our model would
instead need to be updated with empirical evidence from
each country, as it accumulates. For example, countries’
ability to scale up case management services (at least non-
invasive respiratory support) from a nearly universally low
baseline [45] may affect the actual CFR. Moreover, models
that can track epidemics across space and time at a sub-
national level would be preferable, with a structure (e.g.
individual-based modelling) that can incorporate granular
information about any mobility and behavioural data, the
local age distribution of co-morbidities, treatment avail-
ability, the timing and uptake of specific interventions or,
conversely, propagation (superspreading) events such as
mass gatherings.
Severity and CFR assumptions mostly affect the useful-
ness of the shielding option. Shielding criteria should in-
clude a diagnosis of co-morbidity, and as such our findings,
based solely on an age criterion, are under-estimates insofar
as they exclude younger people with known comorbidities.
However, in practice the low non-communicable disease
treatment coverage in Africa means the age criterion would
largely define who is shielded: lowering this threshold, e.g.,
to 50 years, would capture a larger fraction of undiagnosed
co-morbidities. Tiered shielding approaches, whereby
middle-aged moderate-risk people benefit from partial dis-
tancing measures (e.g. support to stay home from work),
may also be worth considering.
Conclusions
COVID-19 epidemics in African countries may bear very
serious and multi-faceted impacts. As of the time of writ-
ing, many African countries are exiting stringent lock-
downs and having to make decisions about how to
manage epidemics despite limited testing and treatment
capacity, which, among other complexities, hampers situ-
ational awareness. Nevertheless, preventive strategies to
substantially mitigate the impacts of COVID-19 are not
foreclosed to African governments and societies, particu-
larly if they receive assistance from humanitarian and de-
velopment actors, diaspora communities, faith-based
institutions, the private sector and others within these so-
cieties who have means to assist the response. Self-
isolation and moderate physical distancing can be effective
interventions. The shielding option can be proactively ex-
plored to test locally appropriate solutions. As the epi-
demic progresses, real-time modelling and strategy
evaluation should be made available to African countries
that do not yet have this expertise: this requires coordin-
ation and proactive support from the worldwide scientific
community, as well as close exchange of information be-
tween modelling teams and country-based surveillance, so
as to gradually refine predictions.
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